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Abstract
We characterize the optimal exploitation paths of two primary energy resources,
a non-renewable polluting resource and a carbon-free renewable one. Both resources
can supply the energy needs of two sectors. Sector 1 is able to reduce its carbon
footprint at a reasonable cost owing to a CCS device. Sector 2 has only access to
the air capture technology, but at a significantly higher cost. We assume that the
atmospheric carbon stock cannot exceed some given ceiling. We show that there may
exist paths along which it is optimal to begin by fully capturing the sector 1's emissions
before the ceiling has been reached. Also there may exist optimal paths along which
both capture devices have to be activated, in which case the sector 1's emissions are
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1 Introduction
Among all the alternative abatement technologies aiming at reducing the anthropogenic
carbon dioxide emissions, a particular interest should be given to the carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS) according to the IPCC (2005, 2007). Even if the efficiency of this tech-
nology is still under assessment1, current engineering estimates suggest that CCS could be
a credible cost-effective approach for eliminating most of the emissions from coal and nat-
ural gas power plants (MIT, 2007). Along this line of arguments, Islegen and Reichelstein
(2009) point out that CCS has considerable potential to reduce CO2 emissions at a "reason-
able" social cost, given the social costs of carbon emissions predicted for a business-as-usual
scenario. CCS is also intended to have a major role in limiting the effective carbon tax,
or the market price for CO2 emission permits under a cap-and-trade system. The crucial
point is then to estimate how far would the CO2 price have to rise before the operator of
power plants would find it advantageous to install CCS technology rather then buy emission
permits or pay the carbon tax. The International Energy Agency (2006) estimates such
a break-even price in the range of $30-90/tCO2 (depending on technology) but, assuming
reasonable technology advances, projected CCS cost by 2030 is around $25/tCO2.
However, geologic CCS presents the disadvantage to apply to the sole large point sources
of pollution such as power plants or huge manufacturings. This technology is prohibitively
costly to filter for instance the CO2 emissions from transportation as far as the energy
input is gasoline or kerosene, small residence heating or scattered agricultural activities.
Hence, the ultimate device to abate carbon dioxide fluxes from any concentrated as well
as diffuse sources would consist in capturing them directly from the atmosphere.
According to Keith et al. (2006), atmospheric carbon capture  or air capture  differs
from conventional mitigation in three key aspects. First, it removes emissions from any
part of the economy with equal ease of difficulty, so its cost provides an absolute cap on
the mitigation cost. Second, it permits reduction in concentrations faster than the natural
carbon cycle. Third, because it is weakly coupled with existing energy infrastructure, air
capture may offer stronger economies of scale and smaller adjustment costs than the more
1CCS technology consists in filtering CO2 fluxes at the source of emission, that is, in fossil energy-
fueled power plants, by use of scrubbers installed near the top of chimney stacks. The carbon would be
sequestered in reservoirs, such as depleted oil and gas fields or deep saline aquifers.
2
conventional mitigation technologies. As underlined by Keith (2009), though this abate-
ment technology costs more than CCS, it allows one to treat small and mobile emission
sources, advantage that may compensate for the intrinsic difficulty of capturing carbon
from the air. Finally, deliberately expressing a double meaning, McKay (2009) claims
about this alternative that "capturing carbon dioxide from thin air is the last thing we
should talk about" (p.240). On the one hand, the energy requirements for atmospheric
carbon capture are so enormous that, according to McKay, it seems actually almost ab-
surd to talk about it. But on the other hand, "we should talk about it because capturing
carbon from thin air may turn out to be our last line of defense if humanity fails to take
the cheaper and more sensible options that may still be available today" (p.240).
Technically speaking, sucking carbon from thin air can be achieved in different ways.2
The probably most credible one is to use a chemical process. This involves a technology
that brings air into contact with a chemical "sorbent" (an alkaline liquid). The sorbent
absorbs CO2 in the air, and the chemical process then separates out the CO2 and recycles
the sorbent. The captured CO2 is stored in geologic deposits, just like the CCS from power
plant. However, chemical air capture is expensive. Estimates of marginal cost range from
$100-200/tCO2, which is larger than the cost of alternatives for reducing emissions such
as CCS. They are also larger than current estimates of the social cost of carbon, which
range from about $7-85/tCO2. But, as concluded by Barrett (2009), bearing the cost of
chemical air capture can become profitable in the future under constraining cap-and-trade
scenarios. Furthermore, we may hope that the cost will decrease, thanks to R&D and
learning by doing.
In the present study, we address the question of the heterogeneity of energy users
regarding the way their carbon footprint can be reduced. We then consider two abatement
technologies and two sectors. The first technology is a conventional emission abatement
device (CCS) which is available at a marginal cost assumed to be socially acceptable.
2The most obvious approach consists in exploiting the process of photosynthesis by increasing the
forestlands or changing the agricultural processes, but this is not the type of device we consider in the
present paper. A close idea can be transposed to the oceans. To make them able to capture carbon faster
then normal, phytoplankton blooms can be stimulated by fertilizing some oceanic iron-limited regions.
A third way is to enhance weathering of rocks, that is to pulverize rocks that are capable of absorbing
CO2, and leave them in the open air. This idea can be pitched as the acceleration of a natural process.
Unfortunately, as claimed by Barrett (2009), the effects of all these devices are difficult to verify, their
potential is limited in any event, and there are concerns about some unknown ecological consequences.
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However, this abatement technology cannot apply to carbon emissions from any type of
activity, but only from large point sources of emissions. The second technology directly
captures carbon in the atmosphere. Its marginal cost is much higher than the emission
capture technology, but it allows to reduce carbon from any sources since the capture
process and the generation of emissions are now disconnected. The first sector, in which
pollution sources are spatially concentrated, can abate its carbon emissions, but not the
second one since energy users are too small and too scattered. The ultimate way for abating
pollution is to directly capture carbon in the atmosphere. But since the atmosphere is a
public good, this kind of pollution reduction will also benefit to sector 1. Whatever the
capture process, we assume that carbon is stockpiled into reservoirs whose size is very
large. Then, as in Chakravorty et al. (2006), this suggests a generic abatement scheme of
unlimited capacity. Finally, energy in each sector can be supplied either by a carbon-based
fossil fuel, contributing to climate change (oil, coal, gas), or by a carbon-free renewable
and non biological resource such, as solar energy.
Using a standard Hotelling model for the non-renewable resource and assuming that
the atmospheric carbon stock should not exceed some critical threshold  as in Chakravorty
et al. (2006)  we characterize the optimal time path of sectoral energy prices, sectoral
energy consumptions, emission and atmospheric abatements. The key results of the paper
are: i) Irrespective of the availability of the air capture technology, it may happen that it
is optimal for the first sector to abate its carbon emissions before the atmospheric carbon
concentration cap is attained.3 ii) Since this type of carbon capture is unable to filter the
emissions from the second sector, it is also optimal for the first sector to abate the totality
of its own emissions, at least at the beginning. These two first results are at variance
with Chakravorty et al. (2006), Lafforgue et al. (2008-a) and (2008-b) who consider a
single sector using energy and a single abatement technology. iii) The atmospheric carbon
capture is only used when the atmospheric carbon stock reaches the ceiling, maintaining
the stock at its critical level. Hence the flow of carbon captured in the atmosphere is lower
than the emission flow of the second sector and the whole carbon emissions coming from
3This result is in accordance with Coulomb and Henriet (2010) who show that, in a model with a single
abatement technology, when technical constraints make it impossible to capture emissions from all energy
consumers, CCS should be used before the ceiling is reached if non capturable emissions are large enough.
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the two sectors are only partially abated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, we lay
down the social planner program and we derive the optimality conditions. In section 4,
we examine the restricted problem in which only the emission carbon capture device is
available. In section 5, we examine how the model reacts when the atmospheric carbon
capture technology is introduced. We also investigate the time profile of the optimal carbon
tax as well as, for each sector, the total burden induced by the mitigation of their emissions.
Finally, we briefly conclude in section 6.
2 Model and notations
Let us consider a stationary economy with two sectors, indexed by i = 1, 2, in which
the instantaneous gross surplus derived from energy consumption are the same.4 For an
identical energy consumption in the two sectors, q1 = q2 = q, the sectoral gross surplus
u1(q) and u2(q) are such that: u1(q) = u2(q) = u(q). We assume that this common function
u satisfies the following standard assumptions. u : R+ → R+ is a function of class C2,
strictly increasing, strictly concave and verifying the Inada conditions: limq↓0 u′(q) = +∞
and limq↑+∞ u′(q) = 0. We denote by p(q) the sectoral marginal gross surplus function
and by qd(p) = p−1(q), the sectoral direct demand function.
In each sector, energy can be supplied by two primary natural resources: a dirty non-
renewable resource (let say oil for instance) and a carbon-free renewable resource (let say
solar energy). Let us denote by X0 the initial oil endowment of the economy, by X(t) the
remaining part of this initial endowment at time t, and by xi(t), i = 1, 2, the instantaneous
consumption flow of oil in sector i at time t, so that:
X˙(t) = −[x1(t) + x2(t)], with X(0) ≡ X0 and X(t) ≥ 0 (1)
xi(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (2)
4Since the focus of the paper is on the effect of the heterogeneity of the energy consumers regarding
the type of abatement technologies they can use, we consider the simple case of two sectors with the same
gross surplus function and the same cost structure, excepted the abatement cost. Introducing different
demand functions and/or different delivery costs for these sectors would imply a more complex analysis
without altering the key message of the paper.
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The delivery cost of oil is the same for both sectors. We denote by cx the corresponding
average cost, assumed to be constant and hence equal to the marginal cost. The delivery
cost includes the extraction cost of the resource, the cost of industrial processing (refining
of the crude oil) and the transportation cost, so that the resource is ready for use by the
consumer in the concerned sector. To keep matter as simple as possible, we assume that no
oil is lost during the delivery process. Equivalently, the oil stock X(t) may be understood
as measured in ready for use units.
Let Z(t) be the stock of carbon within the atmosphere at time t, and Z0 be the initial
stock, Z0 ≡ Z(0). We assume that a carbon cap policy is prescribed to prevent catastrophic
damages which would be infinitely costly. This policy consists in forcing the atmospheric
stock to stay under some critical level Z¯, with Z¯ > Z0.
The atmospheric carbon stock is fed by carbon emission flows resulting from the use
of oil. Let ζ be the quantity of carbon which would be potentially released per unit of oil
consumption whatever the sector in which the oil is used. Thus, the gross pollutant flow
amounts to ζ[x1(t) + x2(t)]. However, this gross emission flow can be abated before being
released into the atmosphere. We assume that emissions from sector 1 can be abated, but
not emissions from sector 2 (or at a prohibitive cost). Emission abatement by carbon cap-
ture and sequestration (CCS) can be achieved when burning oil is spatially concentrated,
as it is the case for instance in the electricity or cement industries, which are good examples
of sector 1's activities. At the other extreme of the spectrum, i.e. in sector 2, there exists
some activities with prohibitively costing emission captures since users are too small or
too scattered. Transportation by cars, trucks and diesel train are good examples of sector
2's industry.5
Let se(t) be this part of carbon emissions from sector 1 which is captured and se-
questered at some average cost ce, assumed to be constant. Then the net pollution flow
issued from sector 1 amounts to:
ζx1(t)− se(t) ≥ 0, se(t) ≥ 0. (3)
5Note that electric traction trains could be good examples of sector 1 users, as well as electric cars (cf.
Chakravorty et al., 2010).
6
In sector 2, the net pollution flow amounts to ζx2(t).
Carbon emission capture is not the unique way to reduce the atmospheric carbon con-
centration. The other process consists in capturing the carbon present in the atmosphere
itself. We denote by sa(t) the instantaneous carbon flow which is abated owing to this
second device, and by ca the corresponding average cost, also assumed to be constant.
Although atmospheric carbon capture seems technically feasible, it is proved to be more
costly than emission capture: ca > ce. The only constraint on this capture flow is:
sa(t) ≥ 0. (4)
Whatever the capture process, from emissions or from the atmosphere, we assume that
carbon is stockpiled into reservoirs whose capacities are unlimited.6
Last, there is also some natural self regeneration effect of the atmospheric carbon stock.
We assume that the natural proportional rate of decay, denoted by α > 0, is constant.
Taking into account all the components of the dynamics of Z(t) results into:
Z˙(t) = ζ[x1(t) + x2(t)]− [sa(t) + se(t)]− αZ(t), Z(0) ≡ Z0 < Z¯ (5)
Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0. (6)
When the atmospheric carbon stock reaches its critical level, i.e. when Z(t) = Z¯, and
absent any active capture policy, i.e. sa(t) = se(t) = 0, then the total oil consumption
x(t) ≡ x1(t)+x2(t) is constrained to be at most equal to x¯, where x¯ is solution of ζx−αZ¯ =
0, that is x¯ = αZ¯/ζ. Then, since the two sectors have the same weight, each one consumes
the quantity x¯/2 of oil at the ceiling when neither CCS nor air capture are activated.
We assume that it may be optimal to abate the pollution for delaying the date of arrival
at the critical threshold and for relaxing the constraint on the oil consumption flow, that
is: cx + ce < cx + ca < u′(x¯).
The alternative energy source is supplied by the carbon-free renewable resource, the
6In order to focus on the abatement options for each sector and their respective costs, we dispense from
considering reservoirs of limited capacity. The question of the size of carbon sinks and of the time profile
of their filling up is addressed by Lafforgue et al. (2008-a) and (2008-b).
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solar energy. We denote by yi(t) the solar energy consumption in sector i, i = 1, 2, and by
cy the average delivery cost of this alternative energy. Because cx and cy both include all
the costs necessary to deliver a ready for use energy unit to the potential users, then both
resources may be seen as perfect substitutes for the consumers, so that we may define the
aggregate energy consumption of sector i as qi = xi + yi, i = 1, 2, as far as the costs cx
and cy are incurred.
The average cost cy is assumed to be constant, the same for both sectors, and higher
than u′(x¯/2). This last condition implies that the optimal energy consumption paths can
be split into two periods: a first one during which only oil is consumed and a second
one during which only solar energy is used.7 We also have to assume that the natural
flow of available solar energy, denoted by yn, is large enough to supply the energy needs
in both sectors during the second period described above.8 Let y˜ be the sectoral energy
consumption that it would be optimal to consume at the marginal cost cy, that is y˜ = qd(cy)
for which u′(y˜) = cy. Then we assume that yn > 2y˜. Under this assumption, no rent has
ever to be imputed for using the solar energy. Thus the only constraint on yi(t) having to
be taken into account along any optimal path is a non-negativity constraint:
yi(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (7)
Finally, the instantaneous social rate of discount, denoted by ρ, ρ > 0, is assumed to
be constant over time.
7Since both cx and cy are set constant, oil and solar cannot be used simultaneously. Using a stock-
dependent marginal extraction cost, but a constant marginal cost of the backstop, together with a damage
function increasing with the atmospheric carbon stock, Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) and Tahvonen (1997)
have shown that there may be a period of simultaneous use of the nonrenewable and the renewable resource.
Furthermore, as underlined by Tahvonen (1997), the conjunction of these assumptions gives rise to a
multiplicity of possible scenarios.
8The case of a rare renewable substitute is analyzed in Lafforgue et al. (2008-b).
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3 Social planner problem and optimality conditions
The problem of the social planner consists in maximizing the sum of the discounted net
current surplus. Let (P ) be this program:
(P ) max
sa,se,xi,yi,i=1,2
∫ ∞
0
{u [x1(t) + y1(t)] + u [x2(t) + y2(t)]− cx [x1(t) + x2(t)]
−cy [y1(t) + y2(t)]− casa(t)− cese(t)} e−ρtdt
subject to (1)-(7).
Let us denote by λX the costate variable of the state variable X, by λZ minus the
costate variable of the state variable Z, by γ's the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the non-negativity constraints on the command variables, and by ν the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the ceiling constraint on Z. As usually done in this kind of problem, we
do not take explicitly into account the non-negativity constraint on X. Thus, droping out
the time index for notational convenience, we may write the current value Lagrangian L
of problem (P ) as follows:
L = u(x1 + y1) + u(x2 + y2)− cx(x1 + x2)− cy(y1 + y2)− casa − cese
−λX(x1 + x2)− λZ [ζ(x1 + x2)− (sa + se)− αZ] + ν(Z¯ − Z)
+
∑
i
γxixi +
∑
i
γyiyi + γsasa + γsese + γ¯se(ζx1 − se)
The static and dynamic first-order conditions are:
u′[x1(t) + y1(t)] = cx + λX(t) + ζ[λZ(t)− γ¯se(t)]− γx1(t) (8)
u′[x2(t) + y2(t)] = cx + λX(t) + ζλZ(t)− γx2(t) (9)
u′[xi(t) + yi(t)] = cy − γyi(t), i = 1, 2 (10)
ca = λZ(t) + γsa(t) (11)
ce = λZ(t)− γ¯se(t) + γse(t) (12)
λ˙X(t) = ρλX(t) (13)
λ˙Z(t) = (ρ+ α)λZ(t)− ν(t) (14)
9
together with the associated complementary slackness conditions. Last, the transversality
conditions take the following forms:
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλX(t)X(t) = 0 (15)
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλZ(t)Z(t) = 0 (16)
Remarks:
1. As expected with a constant marginal delivery cost, the shadow marginal value of the
stock of oil, or mining rent, λX(t), must grow at the social rate of discount ρ. From
(13), we get: λX(t) = λX0e
ρt, with λX0 ≡ λX(0). Thus the transversality condition
(15) reduces to λX0 limt↑∞X(t) = 0. If oil is to have some value, λX0 > 0, then it
must be exhausted along the optimal path.
2. Concerning the shadow marginal cost of the atmospheric carbon stock, λZ(t), note
that before the date tZ at which the ceiling constraint is beginning to be active, we
must have ν(t) = 0 since Z¯ − Z(t) > 0. Then (14) reduces to λ˙Z = (ρ + α)λZ so
that: t < tZ ⇒ λZ(t) = λZ0e(ρ+α)t, with λZ0 ≡ λZ(0). Once the ceiling constraint
is no more active and forever, λZ(t) = 0. Thus, denoting by t¯Z the latest date at
which Z(t) = Z¯, we get: t > t¯Z ⇒ λZ(t) = 0.9
3. In order to simplify the notations in the next sections, it is useful to define the
following prices or full marginal costs and the corresponding sectoral consumption
levels for which the F.O.C's (8) and (9) relative to x1(t) and to x2(t), respectively,
are satisfied:10
- Price or full marginal cost of oil and sectoral oil consumption before the ceiling and
absent any abatement, whatever the sector under consideration: p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) ≡
cx + λX0e
ρt + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t and q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0) ≡ qd
(
p1(t, λX0 , λZ0)
)
.
- Price or full marginal cost of oil for consumption in sector 1 given that emissions
9This characteristics is standard under the assumption of a linear natural regeneration function of the
atmospheric carbon stock. For non linear decay functions, see Toman and Withagen (2000) for instance.
10The upper indexes n = 1, 2, 3 correspond to the order in which the price pn and the quantity q˜n are
appearing along the optimal path. If both pn(t, ...) and pn+m(t′, ...) are appearing along the same path,
then it implies that t < t′.
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from this sector are fully or partially abated, i.e. se(t) > 0, and corresponding oil con-
sumption of sector 1: p2e(t, λX0) ≡ cx +λX0eρt + ζce and q˜2e(t, λX0) ≡ qd
(
p2e(t, λX0)
)
.
- Price or full marginal cost of oil for consumption in sector 2 given that some part of
the atmospheric carbon stock is captured, sa(t) > 0, and corresponding consumption
in this sector: p2a(t, λX0) ≡ cx + λX0eρt + ζca and q˜2a(t, λX0) ≡ qd
(
p2a(t, λX0)
)
.
- Price or full marginal cost of oil once the ceiling constraint Z¯−Z(t) ≥ 0 is no more
active and forever, and corresponding sectoral consumptions, whatever the sector:
p3(t, λX0) ≡ cx + λX0eρt and q˜3(t, λX0) ≡ qd
(
p3(t, λX0)
)
. This last case corresponds
to a pure Hotelling regime.
Solving strategy of the social planner:
In order to solve her problem (P ), the social planner can proceed as follows. First, she
checks whether the most costly device to capture the carbon has ever to be used. The test
consists in solving her problem assuming that the atmospheric carbon capture device is
not available. This is inducing some path of atmospheric carbon shadow cost λZ(t). Next,
according to the outcome of the first step:
- either this shadow cost is permanently lower than the marginal cost of atmospheric
carbon capture, that is λZ(t) < ca for any t ≥ 0, and then the atmospheric carbon capture
device has never to be used because too costly;
- or there exists some time interval during which λZ(t) is higher than ca so that, in
this case, the atmospheric carbon capture device must be activated since the loss in the
marginal net surplus induced by not using it is higher than its marginal cost of use.
This test is performed in Section 4. Section 5 deals with the case in which it is optimal
to activate the air capture device.
4 Optimal policy without atmospheric carbon capture device
This kind of policies have been investigated and characterized in Chakravorty et al. (2006),
and in Lafforgue et al. (2008-a) and (2008-b), but for economies in which any potential
emissions can be captured and sequestered irrespective of the oil consumption sector. Thus,
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in their models, there is a single consumption sector, similar to the sector 1 of the present
model. Two important conclusions of these studies are that: i) it is never optimal to abate
the potential flow of emissions before attaining the critical level Z¯ of atmospheric carbon
concentration; ii) along the phase at the ceiling during which it is optimal to abate, only
some part of the potential emission flow must be abated. Because abating is never optimal
excepted during this phase, then it is never optimal to fully abate the potential flow of
emissions along the optimal path.
As we shall show, it may happen in the present context that: i) abating the potential
emissions of the sector 1 has to begin before the ceiling level Z¯ is attained; ii) when it is
optimal to begin to capture the sector 1 potential emissions, before the ceiling is attained,
then it is optimal to capture its whole potential emission flow.
4.1 Restricted social planner problem
Assuming that the atmospheric carbon capture technology is not available, the social
planner problem reduces to the following restricted problem (R.P ):
(R.P ) max
se,xi,yi,i=1,2
∫ ∞
0
{u [x1(t) + y1(t)] + u [x2(t) + y2(t)]− cx [x1(t) + x2(t)]
−cy [y1(t) + y2(t)]− cese(t)} e−ρtdt
subject to (1), (2), (3), (6), (7) and:
Z˙(t) = ζ[x1(t) + x2(t)]− se(t)− αZ(t), Z(0) = Z0 < Z¯ (17)
The new F.O.C's relative to the command variables, except sa, and to the state variables
are the same then the ones of the unrestricted problem (P ), namely (8)-(14). Also the
associated complementary slackness condition and the transversality conditions (15) and
(16) must hold. We can conclude that remarks 1 and 2 of the previous section 3 also hold
in the present restricted context.
The opportunity for sector 1 to fully or partially abate its emissions strongly depends
upon the level of ce. Hence, we have to distinguish the cases of a full abatement phase
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or a partial abatement phase, before or after being at the ceiling. The next subsections
describe these different possibilities.
4.2 Optimal paths along which it is optimal to capture and sequester
before being at the ceiling
Let us assume that the initial oil endowment is large enough to justify some period at
the ceiling during which Z(t) = Z¯, and that there exists some period during which the
emissions of sector 1 are abated, se(t) > 0. Figure 1 below illustrates the optimal price
path which is obtained in this case.
[Figure 1]
The optimal price path is a seven phases path. Denoting by pi(t), for i = 1, 2, the price
 or full marginal cost  of oil for sector i, these phases are the following:
- Phase 1, before the ceiling and without abatement: [0, te)
During this phase, the oil price is the same for each sector and it is given by p1(t) = p2(t) =
p1(t, λX0 , λZ0). The existence of such a phase requires that λZ0 < ce, so p
1(t, λX0 , λZ0) <
p2e(t, λX0), that is capturing sector 1's emissions would be too costly. p
1(t, λX0 , λZ0) −
p2e(t, λX0) = ζ
[
λZ0e
(ρ+α)t − ce
]
< 0, is increasing so that supporting the marginal shadow
cost of the atmospheric carbon stock, λZ(t) = λZ0e
(ρ+α)t, is less costly than abating, that
is supporting the marginal cost of abating the sector 1's emissions, ce.
The oil consumption of each sector is given by x1(t) = x2(t) = q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0).
The common oil price p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) is increasing at an instantaneous rate which is
higher than the rate of growth of p2e(t, λX0). At the end of the phase, denoted by te, both
prices are equated p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) = p
2
e(t, λX0).
Note that, since p1(t) = p2(t) < u′(x¯) and Z0 < Z¯, then during this phase both x1(t)
and x2(t) are higher than x¯ so that Z(t) is increasing. However, the existence of this phase
requires that, at its end, Z(t) is lower than the critical level Z¯: Z(te) < Z¯.
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- Phase 2, before the ceiling with full abatement of sector 1's emissions: [te, tZ)
From te onwards, we have p
2
e(t, λX0) < p
1(t, λX0 , λZ0). Thus it is now strictly less costly
for sector 1 to abate than not to abate, hence p1(t) = p2e(t, λX0), implying that x1(t) =
q˜2e(t, λX0).
11 Moreover, since the inequality is strict then the potential sector 1's emissions
are fully abated: se(t) = ζx1(t).
Sector 2 is not able to abate its emissions and it must support the carbon shadow
cost ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t per unit of burned oil, so that p2(t) = p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) and x2(t) =
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0).
Note that, during this phase, since Z(te) < Z¯ and p2(t) < u′(x¯), then x2(t) > x¯ and
the atmospheric carbon stock increases. Finally, since p2(t) > p1(t), the first of these two
prices reaching u′(x¯) is p2(t). However, in order that sector 2's consumption begins to be
blockaded at t = tZ , we must have simultaneously p2(t) = u′(x¯) and Z(t) = Z¯ at the end
of the phase.
- Phase 3, at the ceiling with sector 2's oil consumption blockaded and sector
1's emissions fully abated: [tZ , t˜)
During this phase, the oil price in sector 2 is given by p2(t) = u′(x¯) and the oil consumption
of this sector is set to the maximum consumption level allowed by the ceiling constraint,
i.e. x2(t) = x¯. Note that this implies that λZ(t) = [u′(x¯)− p3(t, λX0)]/ζ is decreasing over
time during the phase.12
Since p2e(tZ , λX0) < u
′(x¯), then ce < λZ(t) at the beginning of the phase. Then,
once again, abating emissions is proved to be less costly for sector 1 than supporting the
shadow cost of the atmospheric carbon stock. Consequently, the sector 1's emissions are
fully captured: se(t) = ζx1(t). Since p1(t) = p2e(tZ , λX0), we still have x1(t) = q˜
2
e(t, λX0).
Given that sector 2's emissions are ζx2(t) = ζx¯, full abatement in sector 1 implies that,
during this phase at the ceiling, the atmospheric carbon stock stays at its critical level:
Z˙(t) = 0 and Z(t) = Z¯. Finally, p1(t) = p2e(t, λX0) is increasing during the phase. At the
11Note that during such a phase, because se(t) > 0 then γse(t) = 0, so that from (12) we obtain:
λZ(t) = ce + γ¯se(t). Substituting for λZ(t) in (8) and taking into account that x1(t) > 0, hence γx1(t) = 0,
and y1(t) = 0, we get: u
′ (x1(t)) = cx + λX0e
ρt + ζce, from which we conclude that p1(t) = p
2
e(t, λX0) and
x1(t) = q˜
2
e(t, λX0).
12Since the ceiling constraint is active, then ν(t) is strictly positive and sufficiently high so that λ˙Z(t) =
(ρ+ α)λZ(t)− ν(t) < 0.
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end of the phase, p2e(t, λX0) = u
′(x¯) or, equivalently, λZ(t) = ce.
- Phase 4, at the ceiling with partial abatement of sector 1's emissions: [t˜, t¯e)
From time t˜ onwards, p2e(t, λX0) becomes higher than u
′(x¯). Thus, the only way to satisfy
simultaneously the F.O.C's (8) and (9) on the xi's is to set p1(t) = p2(t) = p2e(t, λX0),
which implies x1(t) = x2(t) = q˜2e(t, λX0) together with a partial abatement of sector 1's
emissions. As far as p2e(t, λX0) is staying under u
′(x¯/2), then the potential emissions
amount to 2ζq˜2e(t, λX0) > ζx¯ = αZ¯. As far as p
2
e(t, λX0) is now higher than u
′(x¯), then the
potential emissions 2ζq˜2e(t, λX0) stays at a lower level than 2ζx¯, so that:
x¯ < 2q˜2e(t, λX0) < 2x¯. (18)
In order to satisfy the atmospheric carbon constraint Z(t) = Z¯, it is sufficient to abate
this part se(t) of the sector 1's emissions for which Z˙(t) = 0. Thus we may have:
2ζq˜2e(t, λX0)− se(t) = ζx¯. (19)
Conditions (18) and (19) imply that:
se(t) = ζ
[
2q˜2e(t, λX0)− x¯
]
< ζq˜2e(t, λX0) = ζx1(t). (20)
Hence, during this phase, emissions from sector 1 are only partially abated and, since
q˜2e(t, λX0) is decreasing through time then the instantaneous rate of capture se(t) is also
decreasing. This solution may be optimal if and only if abating and supporting the shadow
marginal cost of the atmospheric carbon stock are resulting into the same full marginal
cost, that is if and only if λZ(t) is constant and equal to ce. Since sector 2 cannot abate
its emissions, it is supporting the marginal shadow cost of atmospheric carbon and the
condition p1(t) = p2(t) = p2e(t, λX0) = cx + λX0e
ρt + ζλZ(t) guarantees that λZ(t) = ce is
satisfied.13
Since p2e(t, λX0) is increasing over time, there exists some date t¯e at which p
2
e(t, λX0) =
13Again, because the ceiling constraint is effective then ν(t) > 0 and, in order that λ˙Z(t) = 0, we have:
ν(t) = (ρ+ α)λZ(t) = (ρ+ α)ce.
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u′(x¯/2). At this date, x1(t) = x2(t) = x¯/2 and sector 1 ceases to capture its emissions,
se(t) = 0. From t¯e onwards, we have p2e(t, λX0) > u
′(x¯/2) so that the cost of capture of
sector 1's emissions becomes prohibitive.
- Phase 5, at the ceiling and without abatement of sector 1's emissions: [t¯e, t¯Z)
Since abating the sector 1's emissions is now too costly, there is no more abatement and, in
order to not overshoot the critical atmospheric carbon level, we must have p1(t) = p2(t) =
u′(x¯/2) and x1(t) = x2(t) = x¯/2, so that Z˙(t) = 0.
During such a phase, λZ(t) = [u′(x¯)− p3(t, λX0)]/ζ is decreasing. The phase is ending
at time t = t¯Z when λZ(t) = 0, which implies that p3(t, λX0) > u
′(x¯/2) for t > t¯Z .
- Phase 6, pure Hotelling phase: [t¯Z , ty)
This phase is the last one during which energy needs are supplied by oil. This is a pure
Hotelling phase. The energy price is the same for the two sectors: p1(t) = p2(t) =
p3(t, λX0) > u
′(x¯/2), also generating an identical oil consumption in the two sectors:
x1(t) = x2(t) < x¯/2⇒ x(t) < x¯.
Since x(t) < x¯ and Z(t) = Z¯ at the beginning of the phase, then Z(t) < Z¯ for t > t¯Z
justifying the fact that now λZ(t) = 0 from t¯Z onwards.14 Then λZ(t)Z(t) = 0 and the
transversality condition (16) is satisfied.
During the phase, the price is ever increasing and there must exist some time t = ty
at which p3(t, λX0) = cy. At this time, this level of oil price makes the renewable resource
competitive. To be optimal, the switch from the pure Hotelling regime to a pure renewable
regime requires that, at time t = ty, X(t) = 0 so that from ty onwards λX(t)X(t) = 0
warranting that the transversality condition (15) relative to X is satisfied.
- Phase 7, carbon-free renewable energy permanent regime: [ty,+∞)
From ty onwards, the economy follows a pure renewable energy regime which is free of
carbon emissions: p1(t) = p2(t) = cy, x1(t) = x2(t) = 0 and y1(t) = y2(t) = y˜. Since
14However, note that Z(t) is not necessarily monotonically decreasing during this phase. What is sure
is that there exists some critical time interval (t¯Z , t¯Z + ), with  positive and small enough, during which
Z˙(t) < 0. For t > t¯Z +, it may happen that Z˙(t) > 0. But, because x(t) < x¯, even if Z˙(t) were temporally
increasing, it would not be able to go back to Z¯.
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xi(t) = 0, i = 1, 2, then Z˙(t) = −αZ(t) so that Z(t) is permanently decreasing down to 0
at infinity: Z(t) = Z(ty)e−α(t−ty).
Determination of the characteristics of the optimal path:
The optimal path described above is parametrized by eight variables whose values have to
be determined: λX0 , λZ0 , te, tZ , t˜, t¯e, t¯Z and ty. They are given as the solutions of the
following eight equations system.
- Balance equation of non-renewable resource consumption and supply:
2
∫ te
0
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)dt+
∫ tZ
te
[
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0) + q˜
2
e(t, λX0)
]
dt
+
∫ t˜
tZ
[
q˜2e(t, λX0) + x¯
]
dt+ 2
∫ t¯e
t˜
q˜2e(t, λX0)dt
+ [t¯Z − t¯e] x¯+ 2
∫ ty
t¯Z
q˜3(t, λX0)dt = X
0. (21)
- Continuity of the carbon stock at time tZ :
Z0e−αtZ + 2ζ
∫ te
0
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)e
−α(tZ−t)dt
+ζ
∫ tZ
te
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)e
−α(tZ−t)dt = Z¯. (22)
- Price continuity equations:
p1 (te, λX0 , λZ0) = p
2
e (te, λX0) (23)
p1 (tZ , λX0 , λZ0) = u
′(x¯) (24)
p2e
(
t˜, λX0
)
= u′(x¯) (25)
p2e (t¯e, λX0) = u
′(x¯/2) (26)
p3 (t¯Z , λX0) = u
′(x¯/2) (27)
p3(ty, λX0) = cy. (28)
Assuming a positive solution of system (21)-(28), then it is easy to check that all the
optimality conditions of the restricted problem (R.P ) are satisfied. Reciprocally, it is clear
that there exists values of the parameters of the system cx, cy, ce, ζ, α and ρ together
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with values of initial endowments of oil X0 and of atmospheric carbon stock Z0 such that
the path described above is the solution of the restricted problem (R.P ). However, other
solutions may exist, such as the one in which sector 1's emissions have to be captured from
the beginning of the planning horizon.
4.3 Paths along which the oil price is the same for the two sectors
4.3.1 Paths along which it is optimal to abate sector 1's emissions
Example of such a path, solution of the restricted problem (R.P ), is illustrated in Figure
2 below.
[Figure 2]
This kind of paths is characterized by the fact that, at time t = te at which p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) =
p2e(t, λX0), then the common value of these two prices is larger than u
′(x¯) while Z(te) = Z¯
simultaneously.
Because Z0 < Z¯ there must exist a first phase [0, te) during which the ceiling Z¯ is not
yet attained and p1(t) = p2(t) = p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) < p
2
e(t, λX0), hence it is not optimal to
abate sector 1's emissions. At the end of this first phase, both p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) = p
2
e(t, λX0)
and Z(te) = Z¯ so that te coincides with tZ .
The next phase [te, t¯e) is a phase at the ceiling during which p1(t) = p2(t) = p2e(t, λX0).
As in the phase 4 of the previous case  [t˜, t¯e) of the path illustrated in Figure 1  because
sector 2 cannot abate its emissions, we must have λZ(t) = ce during the second phase
of the present path. Also because u′(x¯) < p2e(t, λX0) < u′(x¯/2), then only some part
of the sector 1's emissions have to be captured (cf. the above equation (20)), se(t) <
ζq˜2e(t, λX0) = ζx1(t), and the capture intensity se(t) diminishes. At the end of this phase,
p2e(t, λX0) = u
′(x¯/2), x1(t) = x2(t) = x¯/2 and se(t) = 0.
The third phase [t¯e, t¯Z) is still a phase at the ceiling but without capture of sector 1's
emissions: p1(t) = p2(t) = u′(x¯/2) and x1(t) = x2(t) = x¯/2. The phase is ending when
p3(t, λX0) = u
′(x¯/2), that is when λZ(t) = 0. The fourth and fifth phases are respectively
the standard pure Hotelling phase [t¯Z , ty) and the pure renewable energy phase [ty,∞).
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4.3.2 Paths along which it is never optimal to capture sector 1's emissions
When the abatement cost ce is very high, capturing is proved to never be an optimal
strategy. In this case, we get a four phases optimal price path as illustrated in Figure 3.
[Figure 3]
In Figure 3, p2e(t, λX0) is higher than p
1(t, λX0 , λZ0) along the whole time interval [0, tZ)
before the ceiling. Hence, it is never optimal to capture sector 1's emissions. Such optimal
paths have been characterized in Chakravorty et al. (2006).
5 Optimal policies requiring to activate both capture devices
In this section, we first determine the conditions under which it is optimal to activate the
atmospheric carbon capture device. Next we characterize the optimal paths along which
both carbon capture technologies must be used. Last, we discuss about the time profile of
the optimal carbon marginal shadow cost, that is the optimal unitary carbon tax, as well
as the total burden induced by climate change mitigation policies in each sector, including
the tax burden and the abatement cost.
5.1 Checking whether the atmospheric carbon capture device must be
used along the optimal path
Let us consider the three kinds of optimal price paths which may solve the planner restricted
problem (R.P ) and which have been discussed in the previous section. Clearly, since
p2a(t, λX0) > p
2
e(t, λX0), then for the two last kinds of optimal paths illustrated in Figures
2 and 3 in subsection 4.3, the price trajectory p2a(t, λX0) (not depicted in these figures)
is always located above the optimal price path. Hence, it is never optimal to use the
atmospheric carbon capture device.
For the optimal path illustrated in Figure 1 in subsection 4.2, it may happen that
using the atmospheric carbon capture technology reveals optimal. To check whether this
technology is optimal or not, the test runs as follows. Consider the price path p2a(t, λX0)
(not depicted in Figure 1). Then at time t = tZ , either p2a(t, λX0) < u
′(x¯) or p2a(t, λX0) ≥
u′(x¯). In the first case, there must exist a time interval around t = tZ such that p2(t) >
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p2a(t, λX0) and it would be less costly for sector 2 to bear the cost of the atmospheric
capture ca than the burden of the shadow cost of the atmospheric carbon stock λZ(t).
In the second case, using the atmospheric carbon capture technology could not allow to
improve the welfare.
5.2 Optimal paths
Let us assume now that the atmospheric carbon capture technology has to be used. Then
we may obtain two kinds of optimal paths depending on whether the least costly emission
capture technology has to be activated from the beginning or not. The typical optimal
path along which it is not optimal to capture the sector 1's emission flows from the start
is illustrated in Figure 4 below.
[Figure 4]
The path is an eight phases path and the difference with the trajectory depicted in
Figure 1 is that a new phase [ta, t¯a)  the third one in the present case  appears now
during which some of the atmospheric carbon is captured. The seven other phases are
similar to the ones which have been described in section 4.2. This new phase begins at
t = ta when p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) = p
2
a(t, λX0), that is when λZ(t) = ca. Then for t > ta, it
becomes less costly for sector 2 to undertake atmospheric carbon capture rather than to
pay the social cost of the carbon accumulation within the atmosphere. At the time sector
2's abatement begins, the ceiling is reached, so that ta coincides with tZ .
During this phase [ta, t¯a), each sector uses simultaneously its own abatement technology.
We have p1(t) = p2e(t, λX0) and p2(t) = p
2
a(t, λX0), which implies x1(t) = q˜
2
e(t, λX0) and
x2(t) = q˜2a(t, λX0). Since ce < ca, we also have p1(t) < p2(t) and then x1(t) > x2(t).
Remember that, during this phase, as in the phase 3 of subsection 4.2, sector 1's emissions
are fully captured: se(t) = ζx1(t). Because this is a phase at the ceiling, sector 2 has
just to capture in the atmosphere the necessary amount of carbon in order to maintain
the atmospheric carbon stock at its critical level. It is thus optimal for sector 2 to abate
at a level which is smaller than its own carbon emissions: sa(t) = ζx2(t) − αZ¯ < ζx2(t).
Moreover, since sa(t) > 0, we have ζx2(t) > αZ¯, or equivalently, x2(t) > x¯, implying in
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turns p2(t) < u′(x¯). The price path p2(t) = p2a(t, λX0) being increasing through time, first
the amount of abated carbon by the atmospheric device sa(t) is decreasing, second there
must exist a date at which p2(t) = u′(x¯), that is at which x2(t) = x¯ and sa(t) = 0. At that
time, denoted by t¯a, since sector 1 still fully abates all its emissions, it is no more optimal
for sector 2 to pursue the atmospheric carbon capture. All the efforts to maintain the
carbon stabilization cap are now supported by the sole sector 1 and the economy behaves
as in section 4.2 from phase 3, that if from the date tZ as depicted in Figure 1.
To the eight variables parameterizing the optimal path in the case without atmospheric
capture technology (cf. subsection 4.2), we must here determine the values of two addi-
tional variables: ta and t¯a. But because ta = tZ , then only one more variable has to
be determined. Hence we are left with nine variables that must solve the following nine
equations system:
- Balance equation of non-renewable resource consumption and supply:
2
∫ te
0
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)dt+
∫ ta=tZ
te
[
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0) + q˜
2
e(t, λX0)
]
dt
+
∫ t¯a
ta=tZ
[
q˜2e(t, λX0) + q˜
2
a(t, λX0)
]
dt+
∫ t˜
t¯a
[
q˜2e(t, λX0) + x¯
]
dt
+2
∫ t¯e
t˜
q˜2e(t, λX0)dt+ [t¯Z − t¯e] x¯+ 2
∫ ty
t¯Z
q˜3(t, λX0)dt = X
0. (29)
- Continuity of the carbon stock at time tZ : identical to (22).
- Price continuity equations: identical to (23)-(28) except that (24) is now replaced by
the two following equations:
p1 (ta, λX0 , λZ0) = p
2
a(ta, λX0) (30)
p2a (t¯a, λX0) = u
′(x¯) (31)
5.3 Time profile of the optimal carbon tax
The trajectory of the carbon marginal shadow cost corresponding to the optimal path
illustrated in Figure 4 is characterized by:
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λZ(t) =

λZ0e
(ρ+α)t , t ∈ [0, tZ)
ca , t ∈ [tZ , t¯a)[
u′(x¯)− p3(t, λX0)
]
/ζ , t ∈ [t¯a, t˜)
ce , t ∈ [t˜, t¯e)[
u′(x¯/2)− p3(t, λX0)
]
/ζ , t ∈ [t¯e, t¯Z)
0 , t ∈ [t¯Z ,∞)
(32)
This shadow cost can be interpreted as the optimal unitary tax to be levied on the net
carbon emissions. Its time profile is illustrated in Figure 5 below.
[Figure 5]
The unitary tax rate is first increasing but is bounded from above by the highest
marginal abatement cost ca which is attained when it becomes optimal to use this abate-
ment device and, simultaneously, when the atmospheric carbon stock constraint begins to
be active, that is at time t = ta = tZ . Given that it is always possible to choose to abate
rather than release the carbon in the atmosphere, the maximal tax rate of carbon emis-
sions is necessarily determined by the highest marginal cost permitting to avoid polluting
carbon releases.
During the ceiling phases, from tZ up to t¯Z , the carbon tax is either constant or
decreasing. First, as long as sector 2 abates, that is between ta and t¯a, it is sufficient to set
the tax rate equal to ca to induce an optimal atmospheric capture by sector 2, given that
sector 1 fully abates its own emissions. The same applies between t˜ and t¯e for sector 1 by
setting the tax rate equal to ce, given that sector 2 no more abates. Between these two
phases, that is between t¯a and t˜, and during the last phase at the ceiling, that is between
t¯e and t¯Z , the tax rate strictly decreases. This is due to the oil price increase and to the
fact that the emission level is constrained by x¯ for sector 2 during [t¯a, t˜), and by x¯/2 for
each sector during [t¯e, t¯Z).
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5.4 Time profile of the tax burdens and the sequestration costs
Assume now that the above tax optimal rate is implemented. Such a tax is inducing a
fiscal income Γ1(t) ≡ [ζx1(t)− se(t)]λZ(t) for sector 1 and Γ2(t) ≡ [ζx2(t)− sa(t)]λZ(t) for
sector 2. The sequestration cost in each sector simply writes as the sequestered carbon flow
times the respective marginal cost of sequestration: S1(t) ≡ se(t)ce and S2(t) ≡ sa(t)ca.
Then, the total burden of carbon for each sector is the sum of the fiscal burden and the
sequestration cost. Denoting by Bi(t) i = 1, 2 this total burden, the two following tables
detail its components for each sector.
Γ1(t) S1(t) B1(t) Phases
ζq˜1(t)λZ0e
(ρ+α)t 0 ζq˜1(t)λZ0e
(ρ+α)t [0, te)
0 ζq˜2e(t)ce ζq˜
2
e(t)ce [te, t˜)
ζ
[
x¯− q˜2e(t)
]
ce ζ
[
2q˜2e(t)− x¯
]
ce ζq˜
2
e(t)ce [t˜, t¯e)
(x¯/2)
[
u′(x¯/2)− p3(t)] 0 (x¯/2) [u′(x¯/2)− p3(t)] [t¯e, t¯Z)
0 0 0 [t¯Z ,∞)
Table 1. Decomposition of the total carbon burden for sector 1
Γ2(t) S2(t) B2(t) Phases
ζq˜1(t)λZ0e
(ρ+α)t 0 ζq˜1(t)λZ0e
(ρ+α)t [0, ta)
ζx¯ca ζ[q˜2a(t)− x¯]ca ζq˜2a(t)ca [ta, t¯a)
x¯
[
u′(x¯)− p3(t)] 0 x¯ [u′(x¯)− p3(t)] [t¯a, t˜)
ζq˜2e(t)ce 0 ζq˜
2
e(t)ce [t˜, t¯e)
(x¯/2)
[
u′(x¯/2)− p3(t)] 0 (x¯/2) [u′(x¯/2)− p3(t)] [t¯e, t¯Z)
0 0 0 [t¯Z ,∞)
Table 2. Decomposition of the total carbon burden for sector 2
Their time profile are depicted upon Figure 6 below.
[Figure 6]
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Before the ceiling phases, the shapes of the total burden trajectories may be either
increasing or decreasing depending upon oil demand elasticity. Once the ceiling is reached,
the total burden gradually declines down to zero at the end of the ceiling phase.
For sector 1, the total burden identifies to the sole tax burden as long as abatement is
not activated, that is before te. Between te and t˜, sector 1, fully abating its emissions, does
not bear the carbon tax burden (Γ1(t) = 0), but bears the sequestration cost S1(t). During
this phase, since sector 1's emissions decrease, so does its sequestration cost and then its
total burden. During the next phase, between t˜ and t¯e, it is no more optimal for sector 1
to fully abate its emissions and then, this sector bears a mix of tax burden and abatement
cost. Its gross carbon emissions decrease, but its sequestration flow decreases at an even
higher rate resulting in an increase in the net emission flow. The cost of sequestration thus
decreases. Since the tax rate is constant and equal to the sequestration marginal cost ce,
the fiscal burden rises. The combined effect of these two evolutions results in a declining
total carbon burden for sector 1. Over the last ceiling phase, between t¯e and t¯Z , sector 1
no more abates and bears only the fiscal burden. Then its total burden is declining down
to zero when the ceiling constraint becomes no more active, that is at time t¯Z .
During the atmospheric capture phase, that is between ta and t¯a, sector 2 is indifferent
between paying the tax and abating from the atmosphere. Since it does not fully abate,
it bears both the tax on this part of its emissions which are not captured, and the seques-
tration cost burden. During this phase, its carbon burden is constant because i) the tax
rate is constant and equal to ca and ii) sector 1 fully abates its emissions and sector 2's
net emissions are constrained by x¯. Its sequestration effort decreases since gross emissions
decline. After t¯a and during all next phases at the ceiling, the total burden of sector 2
reduces to the sole fiscal burden and it is thus decreasing over time as discussed above.
We conclude by two remarks. First, the total fiscal income, that is Γ1(t) + Γ2(t),
jumps down twice at each time when either sector 1 or sector 2 begins to abate. Hence,
any environmental policy should take into account the ability of polluters to undertake
abatement activities and thus to escape from the tax. Second, since sector 2 is constrained
by the higher cost of its abatement technology, its fiscal contribution as well as its total
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burden are larger or equal than the total burden of sector 1 when pollutive potential
intensities and demand functions are the same for both sectors.
6 Conclusion
In a Hotelling model, we have determined the optimal CCS and air capture policies for an
economy composed of two kinds of energy users differing by the degree of concentration of
their carbon emissions. The concentrated emissions sector has access to geological carbon
capture in addition to air capture while the diffuse emissions sector can only abate its
emissions through air capture. Both sectors face a global maximal atmospheric carbon
concentration constraint.
In this framework, we have shown that carbon sequestration by the first sector must
begin strictly before the atmospheric carbon stock reaches its critical threshold and that
sector 1's emissions have to be fully abated during a first time phase with constant marginal
costs of abatement and a stationary demand schedule. This result stands in contrast with
the findings of Chakravorty et al. (2006) that abatement should begin only whence the
atmospheric ceiling has been attained in a model with one energy using sector and a single
abatement technology.
This difference appears as a consequence of the emission concentration heterogeneity of
energy users, CCS being only available for concentrated emissions sectors like thermic elec-
tricity plants, steel mills or cement factories and not for the diffuse emissions by transport
of house heating. This heterogeneity constrains the potential of CCS to be at most equal
to the sole emissions of sector 1 and thus to be always smaller than the total carbon emis-
sions of fossil energy consumers. In a constant CCS cost setting there is no limitation over
the amount of abated emissions below the gross emission level and in a case where diffuse
emissions alone would drive atmospheric concentration up to its maximum threshold, full
abatement by sector 1 of its emissions appears as the only optimal choice for the economy.
Furthermore, with or without air capture possibilities, delaying CCS after the atmospheric
carbon stock reaches is maximum level is dominated by an earlier development of CCS by
sector 1 because of the inability of sector 2 to use carbon sequestration. However, even with
air capture availability, the total carbon emission flow from the two sectors remains only
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partially abated resulting in a time phase during which the atmospheric carbon constraint
binds over the fossil fuel consumption possibilities of the two sectors.
Note also that atmospheric capture is undertaken only after the beginning of the at-
mospheric carbon ceiling phase and that sector 2's abatement effort is always smaller than
its gross contribution to carbon emissions, a result which stands now in accordance with
Chakravorty et al. (2006). It is interesting to observe that the economy may experience a
rather complex dynamic pattern of energy price while being constrained by the atmospheric
carbon ceiling. With constant abatement unit costs, the energy price at the consumer stage
is composed of a sequence of constant price phases separated by increasing price phases.
This complex shape translates to the time profile of the carbon tax implemented to meet
the atmospheric concentration objective.
The carbon tax must increase over time before the ceiling but note that sector 1 escapes
the tax when fully abating its emissions and bears a comparatively lower sequestration cost,
the fiscal burden being transferred over sector 2. Such a discrepancy between sectors is
justified by the fact that sector 2 benefits from the carbon sequestration efforts of sector
1, a sort of positive "external" effect of sector 1 upon sector 2. Of course this is not a true
external effect since it comes through the carbon price. But this opens interesting policy
questions regarding the use of carbon regulation to develop non polluting transportation
devices, like the electric car, electricity being provided by plants making use of CCS tech-
nologies. During the ceiling phase, the carbon tax has an overall decreasing shape down
to zero at the end of the phase. But this general shape is actually composed of a complex
sequence of decreasing rates phases separated by constant rates phases, these last phases
corresponding respectively to the air capture phase and to the partial carbon sequestra-
tion phase by sector 1 which should follow the full carbon abatement phase by this sector.
Thus inducing through the carbon tax the optimal sequence of abatement efforts by the
two sectors appears as a rather complicated exercise in fiscal policy, the policy maker hav-
ing to adjust over time the carbon tax rate according to the optimal sequence of abatement
phases.
A second source of heterogeneity between sectors comes from the differing availability
of the two carbon abatement technologies. As stated before, CCS is only available for
sector 1 while air capture may apply to emissions coming from any source. Alternatively
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we could have assumed that sector 2 abates its emissions at a unit cost ca through some
dedicated technology while sector 1 abates through CCS at a unit cost ce, ce < ca, without
altering the results of our analysis. To reinforce the heterogeneity argument, it can be
shown (Amigues et al., 2011) that, when energy users have a access to a single carbon
abatement technology, then even learning or R&D over this technology do not justify to
abate before being at the atmospheric ceiling. However, because the time at which the
ceiling is attained is endogenous, learning by doing will affect the time profile of the ceiling
phase. An interesting extension of the work would be to analyze the effects of learning by
doing or dedicated R&D over CCS and air capture in an heterogeneous use framework.
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Figure 1: Optimal path along which it is optimal to abate before the ceiling
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Figure 3: Optimal path along which the energy price is the same for each sector and it is
not optimal to abate sector 1's emissions
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